LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY DURING THE FIRST YEAR OF THE CIVIL WAR

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During the first eight months of 1861 the majority of Kentuckians favored neither secession from the Union nor coercion of the seceded states. It has been claimed that since the state opposed secession it was pro-Union, but such an assertion is true only in a limited sense. Having the same domestic institutions as the cotton states, Kentucky was concerned by the tension-filled course of events. Though the people of Kentucky had no desire to see force used on the southern states, neither did they desire to leave the Union or see it broken.

Of course, there were some who openly and loudly advocated that their beloved commonwealth should join its sister states in the South. The large number of young men from the state who joined the Confederate army attest to this. At the same time, there were many at the other extreme who maintained that Kentucky should join the northern states in forcibly preventing any state from withdrawing from the Union.

Many of the moderates felt any such extreme action, which would result in open hostility between the two sections, would be especially harmful to a border state such as Kentucky. As the *Daily Louisville Democrat* phrased it, "No matter which party wins, we lose." [1] Thus moderates emphasized the economic advantages of a united country, sentimental attachment to the Union, and the hope of compromise. In several previous crises the country had found compromise through the leadership of great Kentuckians. Hope prevailed that such might be accomplished again.

Eventually Kentucky decided to declare itself neutral. In this manner it could most nearly keep the *status quo* of the state. Neutrality would help preserve political good will with both sections, would maintain Kentucky's economic connections, and thus would secure all the real benefits of a united country.[2]

The city of Louisville virtually mirrored the feeling throughout the state. Some Louisvillians praised the merits of secession; others emphasized the need for quick coercive action, but most desired neither.

Captain Thomas Speed, a Union officer who wrote *The Union Cause in Kentucky, 1860-1865* and some of the Civil War history of Louisville in the massive two-volume *Memorial History of Louisville,* main-

tains that the city was overwhelmingly Unionist. However, some of the incidents which he labels as pro-Union were in reality measures for the protection of Louisville from either side.

On April 19, 1861, the mayor sent a message to the city council urging measures of defense for the city and the making of necessary appropriations. The council responded by appropriating $50,000 and by appointing a military board to regulate and disburse the funds. Then on May 19, the mayor reported that eighteen companies of men (later called the Home Guard) had been voluntarily organized and offered themselves for the defense of the city.[3] These measures were not pro-Union or pro-Confederate. Rather they were to prepare the city to defend itself against any oppressor.

Despite this, the fact remains that there was a considerable amount of secessionist feeling and activity in the city. This is reflected by the number of young Louisvillians who joined the Confederate army.

On April 16, 1861, Colonel John Allen published a call in the Louisville papers for volunteers for the southern cause, and soon Colonel Philip Lee began to raise troops for the same purpose. Two days later Blanton Duncan announced that he and his company would leave in a few days for the South, and later in the month Captains Ben M. Anderson and Fred Van Alstine left with their troops by steamer for New Orleans. Shortly thereafter Duncan and Captain Michael Lapeille each left the city by rail with companies of one hundred each, and Captain John D. Pope of Louisville left with 114.[4] Similar recruiting continued until September when the First Kentucky Brigade of the Confederate Infantry was organized in the city and immediately went south where it distinguished itself as the "Orphan Brigade."[5]

Besides this, there were several "Southern Rights" meetings held in Louisville in the spring and summer,[6] and by the admission of the *Louisville Daily Courier* there were at least two thousand "Southern Rights" voters in the city in August.[7] Later, after the neutrality had been shattered and the Union troops had moved into the city, there were so many arrests that William Tecumseh Sherman remarked, "As you can well understand, we would soon fill all the places of confinement in Louisville were we to arrest and imprison all who may be dangerous."[8] Also General Lorenzo Thomas, the Adjutant General, quotes Sherman as saying, "The young men were generally secessionists and had joined the Confederates . . . ."[9]

The most outspoken and influential secessionist spokesman in the city was Walter N. Haldeman, the editor of the *Louisville Daily Courier.* Repeatedly this paper urged the citizens of the state to resist the encroachments of the North and to unite with the South. It clearly

denounced each trade restriction put on the city by federal officials, urged the people to rise up in arms against Cincinnati for interfering with the river traffic, predicted that General Robert J. Anderson would set aside the laws of the land, lamented that all the Associated Press dispatches were full of lies because they first passed through the hands of northern officials, beseeched all "Southern Rights" men in the city to vote against Lincoln men, and claimed that it would be foolish and reckless for Kentucky not to unite with the southern states.[10]

With such bold assertions, it is not surprising that the federal government took steps to suppress this southern sympathizer. The government, however, confined itself at first to preventing the sale of the paper in St. Louis since the administration was cautious not to do anything that might chase Kentucky into the rebel camp;[11] but once Kentucky abandoned its policy of neutrality, the federal officials acted swiftly. On the same day Kentucky cast its lot with the North the *Courier* was excluded from the mails and was suppressed by military force because it had been "found to be an advocate of treason and hostility to the Government and authority of the United States . . . ." [12]

Soon the newspaper reappeared in Bowling Green while the Confederates were in the southern part of the state, and it was said to be twice as reckless as when published in Louisville.[13]

Such pro-southern sentiment actually reflects only a small percentage of the people in the city. A larger number, though how many is impossible to ascertain, were for remaining in the Union but not necessarily for coercing the seceded states.

Both the *Louisville Daily Journal* and the *Daily Louisville Democrat,* the other leading newspapers, fit this category. The *Journal,* a newspaper which became a mighty force in the state during the war, was edited by George D. Prentice. Prentice ardently denounced secession and referred to it as "a wild, unpatriotic, and insane idea." [14] Even though he eventually had two sons in the Confederate army, he never was able to write anything favorable about the Confederacy. Once Kentucky abandoned neutrality the paper lent its full support to the Union cause, though Prentice violently condemned Lincoln for his slavery policy.

John H. Harney was editor of the *Daily Louisville Democrat,* a paper which strongly supported efforts at compromise and declared secession to be a very dangerous experiment.[15] Harney felt that most of the people in the North, as well as in the South, were for the union of the whole country; but the politicians, who were only for themselves, were the ones really causing the trouble. He wrote, "Shall the country be plunged into civil war by the action of political tricksters? Forbid it, heaven!" [16]

Like the *Journal,* once hostilities began the *Democrat* supported the Union; but with the coming of the Emancipation Proclamation and various military rigors, it became more critical of the administration than the *Journal* and assumed the leadership of the Peace Democrats.[17]

The majority of the voters in Louisville certainly agreed with Prentice and Harney that the state should remain in the Union. In the May 6 city election John M. Delph, a Union candidate for mayor, defeated his "Southern Rights" opponent by better than three to one; and in June, Robert Mallory, a Union man who favored coercion of the southern states, was re-elected to Congress by a majority of 6,224 votes.[18] Then in the August state-wide election held two weeks after the battle of Bull Run, Louisville elected Union men over "State Rights" candidates by substantial majorities. Of six men elected from Louisville for the state legislature, the Union men received a total of 16,172 votes as compared to 2,547 for the "State Rights" candidates, which is better than a six to one majority.[19]

This Union sentiment is further shown by the spontaneous formation of the Union Club in Louisville in the spring of 1861. This was a secret organization in which each member was bound by a solemn oath to support the flag and the government of the United States. It is estimated, though perhaps without sufficient evidence, that within six weeks this society had 6,000 members in the city and became a most effective agent in the formation of the Home Guard and in securing enlistments for the Union army.[20]

These enlistments began around the end of April and continued until the war was over. According to Thomas Speed a great body of enlisted men and commissioned officers from Louisville were in the 5th, 6th, 15th, 28th, and 34th Infantry, the 2nd and 4th Cavalry, and three batteries raised at Louisville for its own protection.[21] With so many enlisting on both sides, "it was no uncommon sight in Louisville shortly after this, to see a squad of recruits for the Union service marching up one side of a street while a squad destined for the Confederacy was moving down the other."[22]

Perhaps the strongest pro-Union group in the city outside of the Union Club was the city council which became increasingly more Unionist as the months passed. In April a resolution was proposed by one member of the council that the true position of Kentucky was with the South, but this motion received only two votes.[23] Later when it was announced that General Robert Anderson would come to the city, the council voted to welcome him and extend the hospitalities of the city. In July it took steps to prevent persons from inducing minors to join the Confederate army, and the next month it appropriated $200,000 to be used to encourage volunteering into the Union army.[24] In Sep-

tember the board of aldermen passed a resolution inquiring into the loyalty of its members[25] and is alleged to have soon become a center of Union enthusiasm and military activities. From this time on the city council cooperated thoroughly with federal officials in the city.

While the Union Club and city council were strongly Unionist, the citizens engaging in trade and commerce presented a different and far more complex story.

In 1861 Louisville was an extremely strategic city for both the South and the North. As a result of its location on the Ohio River and great advances in river trade, the city was sometimes called the "mistress of the commerce of the South." [26]

Louisville was also strategically important because of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad which was completed shortly before the war began. Since this was the only operating railroad which passed through the state to the South and was the only channel of rapid communication from the Ohio to the South and Southeast, it was considered extremely important to both sides.

For several months prior to and after the actual outbreak of hostilities, the L&N carried on a very profitable trade in provisions with Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, and other southern states. This trade was especially heavy in 1861 because there had been crop failures in these states the preceding year which meant more provisions had to be shipped in from other markets. Also the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, the only other railroad connecting the North with the South in this area, was deprived of its ultimate outlet on the Ohio River at Cairo, Illinois, by the concentration of northern troops there and thus ceased to carry provisions southward. This then left the entire business to the L&N.[27]

Once the hostilities began, the Confederates feverishly began buying supplies of all sorts north of the Ohio and rushing them south before it was too late. Naturally prices spiralled upward, and some northern traders made fortunes overnight. Speed was essential to the southerner, and the only fast way to get the provisions was over the L&N.

Frantically the road strove to cope with the situation, but it simply was not able to do so. So many provisions came to the depot to be shipped southward that goods were piled in and around the depot and anywhere space could be found. Ultimately the L&N declared a temporary embargo between April 29 and May 8 in order to give the company ten days to clear the line.[28] As shipment after shipment went south, Louisville citizens began to fear that not enough would be left in the city for food. Alarmed by such rumors, attempts were made to tear up the tracks south of the city in order to prevent further shipments. Some crowds became so unruly that James Guthrie, president

of the line, found it necessary to send armed guards ahead of the trains to protect them from violence.[29]

Throughout the month of May the provisions continued to be carried at a record-breaking pace. An anonymous individual is quoted as summing up the situation as follows:

> Day and night for weeks past, every avenue of approach to the depot has been blocked with vehicles waiting to discharge their loads, while almost fabulous prices have been paid for hauling and the road has been taxed to its utmost capacity to carry through the enormous quantities of freight delivered to it.[30]

This was the situation despite the fact the United States Government had decided to restrict such shipments.

On May 2, 1861, Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, issued a circular to all customs officials on the northern and northwestern waters to search all water craft, railroad cars, and other vehicles "laden with merchandise the ultimate destination of which you have good reason to believe is for any port or place under insurrectionary control" and to seize all "arms, munitions of war, provisions, or other supplies . . . ."[31]

This circular had little effect in Louisville. The customs establishment in the city was too small (only one surveyor, one chief clerk, and one messenger)[32] to stop the southern traffic unless the L&N voluntarily agreed to stop, and the railroad had no intention of stopping so lucrative a trade. President Guthrie justified this action by maintaining that Chase's order did not apply to his road since it was in a neutral state.[33] Secretary Chase was aware that the rules in Louisville remained unexecuted, but he feared any more drastic course would drive Kentucky into the Confederacy.[34] Thus the traffic rolled merrily on.

By the end of May Secretary Chase changed his mind. He concluded that by allowing Louisville to continue this trade, the federal government was losing too much. Thus, on May 25 he ordered the Louisville surveyor to stop the "treasonable trade" with the insurgents.[35] Three days later in a letter to George D. Prentice, Chase stated that it seemed "indispensable that supplies to the Rebels from Louisville shall cease." Also he said that he hoped such cessation would be a voluntary act of the people but that Robert J. Anderson, the former commander of Fort Sumter, was being ordered to the city to help the customs officers just in case he was needed.[36]

The surveyor, however, refused to enforce the circular "upon the ground that it would cause such an excitement . . . . that a mob would interfere."[37] Other prominent men in Louisville denied that such would take place,[38] whereupon the federal government quickly appointed a new surveyor, Charles B. Cotton.

Acting upon federal orders, Cotton announced that after June 24 no shipments would be allowed over the L&N without a permit from his office.[39] When this news reached Guthrie, he immediately filed suit before a federal judge in Louisville against the government for damages to the railroad.[40]

Prevented from shipping directly from Louisville to the South, the merchants quickly resorted to other measures in order to continue their profitable trade. Since the customs officials were only at Louisville, it was decided to have the goods moved by wagon to some point south of the city and there load them on the railroad. Thus immense quantities of goods were hauled by wagons night and day to Shepherdsville, a town eighteen miles south of Louisville, where they were then loaded on the L&N and shipped south.[41]

Soon, however, the merchants improved on this. Since the federal trade restrictions dealt only with items shipped to seceded states, the merchants began to send their goods from Louisville to Kentucky towns on the Tennessee line. Tennesseans could then get the goods there and ship them wherever they pleased.[42]

The federal government made several new attempts to halt these evasions of the law. A closer watch was kept on the cargo shipped over the L&N, and troops were sent to enforce the regulations.[43] Trains were ordered to leave by day to prevent smuggling, and inspectors were sent to the interior railway towns to prevent suspicious goods from being loaded.[44] Wagons were watched and goods which appeared to be destined for the Confederacy were removed.

Some shipments captured by treasury aides were later forcibly recovered by armed men and sent to Tennessee. Such action led William P. Mellen, a special agent of the Treasury Department, to advise local treasury aides to seize goods only if their communities were pro-Union and would sustain them. Otherwise the goods should be allowed to proceed unless they were arms or munitions. This was all that could be done until military aid was available.[45]

This illicit trade was known to all, but the L&N had no interest in stopping it, and the federal government was reluctant to use military force. Such military force would stop much, though not all of the illicit trade, but what the federal government feared was that such a display of force might drive Kentucky into the Confederacy.

Ironically it was Confederate action which eventually stopped this traffic southward. In May the Confederate Congress placed an embargo on the exportation of cotton to the North; and later this was extended to include sugar, rice, molasses, tobacco, syrup, and naval stores.[46] On July 4 Governor Isham Harris of Tennessee placed an agent on the L&N at the Tennessee line to prevent contraband goods from being

shipped north and also confiscated all the L&N rolling stock in Tennessee. Harris then demanded that Guthrie cooperate with the Confederacy in maintaining train service, but the L&N president steadfastly refused the Tennessean's demands.[47]

Then on September 18, 1861, Brigadier-General Simon Bolivar Buckner of the Confederate army seized the entire line of the L&N up to Lebanon Junction, which is only thirty miles from Louisville. Buckner issued a manifesto to Guthrie suggesting that the road's agents and employees continue to work but under Buckner's military control.[48] Once again Guthrie refused, declaring that such action would be giving aid to the enemy.

Referring to the South as "the enemy" was something new for Guthrie, but it is indicative of his changed policy. Whereas previously he had espoused Union sentiment, he nevertheless used every means available to make a profit for the L&N by trading with the South even when such action was forbidden and by charging the federal government higher rates than other roads charged.[49] Now when southern officials threatened to bankrupt his line by confiscation and attempted to dictate the policy of the road, he became one of the strongest Unionists in the state.

Of course, the problem is that no one knows exactly where Guthrie stood prior to this time. He was a prominent national figure having served as Secretary of the Treasury under Pierce and having been a favorite son candidate for President in the Democratic Convention of 1860. Contrary to some of his speeches, many agree that his sympathies basically lay toward the South. Though he opposed secession, he felt that the South had the right of revolution. He strongly believed, however, that had the South stayed in the Union it could have rendered Lincoln powerless to harm. Nevertheless, whatever his views may have been, it appears that in the end it was his business concern rather than his political ideals which dictated his choice.

By March, 1862, Union forces had driven the Confederate army out of the state and had reopened the entire line of the L&N. From this time on the road was a great line of supply for the armies and the chief avenue of communication with the front,[50] though it continued charging higher rates and giving the War Department many headaches.

It is important to remember, however, that it was not the L&N alone which made Louisville so important, but also the large amount of river traffic which the city controlled.

The Confederates hoped by their economic policy regarding the Mississippi River to induce the Northwest to enter the Confederacy. Thus on February 18, 1861, in its first tariff act, the Confederacy provided that all products of the farm, manufactured or raw, plus munitions of

war should be admitted duty free. Louisville was very pleased with this act, for it meant that there would be free trade both to the North and South. As a result, in the spring of 1861 there was an immense amount of trade that went to the Confederacy from the Ohio River Valley, and Louisville made herself the great collecting and shipping center for this commerce.[51]

Though many in the North were not pleased by this traffic to the South, they did tolerate it as long as there were no indications of immediate conflict. However, once Sumter was fired upon, many in the North became incensed by what was being shipped down the Ohio River for the South. One shipment of bacon and guns headed for the South via Louisville was seized by a group of enraged Cincinnati citizens. Following this irate action, the city of Cincinnati commissioned two steamers to patrol the river.[52]

The news of this action so angered the citizens of Louisville that some were ready to march against Cincinnati with armed forces and compel the city to relinquish its hold on the river.[53] Headlines in the *Louisville Daily Courier* screamed: "To Arms! To Arms! — Cincinnati Seizes Southern Property! Kentucky Will You Stand Back?" [54]

A group of Louisvillians decided not to stand back. By way of retaliation they took possession of an armory, seized two small cannons, dragged them to the bend in the river, and prepared to confiscate a steamer from St. Louis loaded with arms for Pittsburgh. They desisted only after Simon B. Buckner, commander of the Kentucky State Guard, assured them the arms were for his men.[55]

Though foiled in this attempt, a delegation of Louisville businessmen did go to Cincinnati on April 23 to present a protest against such interference with the river trade. There they were considerately received and were assured by the mayor, who read a statement from the governor, that except when absolutely certain a cargo contained munitions for the South, there would be no further seizures.[56]

It was not long after this that the Chase circular with its trade restrictions was issued; but unlike the railroad restrictions, those on the river commerce were effectively carried out. Many of the boats were pressed into military service, and the river traffic was so restricted that at times the wharf looked quite desolate.

But by the end of 1861 the city began to show a few signs of its former river commerce as more and more boats began to arrive; and as the Confederates were pushed out of the state, a distinct trade revival took place. In fact so much trade came that by March, 1862, it could be said that the wharf "was completely blockaded with the tobacco, cotton, and corn brought up from below by the Henderson and Cumberland river boats." [57] From this time on, the wharf was habitu-

ally crowded with army and medical supplies, wagons, ammunition, foodstuffs, refugees, prisoners, and wounded soldiers.[58]

The actual hostilities in Kentucky did not begin until September 3, 1861, when General Leonidas Polk of the Confederate army occupied Columbus, Kentucky. Immediately General Ulysses S. Grant and his army occupied Paducah; and on September 7, Brigadier-General Robert J. Anderson removed the headquarters of the Department of the Cumberland from Cincinnati to Louisville.[59]

Soon after this Albert Sidney Johnston, commander of the Confederate forces in the West, ordered Simon B. Buckner, formerly the commander of the Kentucky State Guard, with five thousand Confederate troops to proceed by rail to occupy Bowling Green, Kentucky.[60] This was accomplished by September 18, and advanced detachments were sent to within thirty miles of Louisville.[61]

Great excitement prevailed in Louisville, for most felt that Buckner intended to occupy their city. As General William T. Sherman later wrote, "The city was full of all sorts of rumors . . . . Many of the rebel families expected Buckner to reach Louisville at any moment." [62] The fact that no trains from the South arrived in Louisville and that telegraph communication south of Louisville was impossible for the next three days added greatly to the rumors about Buckner's movements and the size of his forces.[63]

These rumors undoubtedly exaggerated the size of Buckner's troops, but there was good reason for apprehension. Although General Anderson was in the city and at his request William T. Sherman had been sent to join him, they had no troops.[64] The only men they could immediately use were Lovell H. Rousseau's two thousand recruits at Camp Joe Holt across the Ohio River and the Home Guard of Louisville, but neither was ready for the field. Nevertheless, they had to be used.

General Anderson and James Guthrie felt that Buckner would try to reach Muldraugh's Hill, a spot about twenty-five miles southwest of Louisville which Buckner knew to be a very strong position. Thus it was decided that Sherman would take all available troops there in an effort to secure a position on the hill before Buckner could reach it.[65]

By shortly after midnight over two thousand men from Camp Joe Holt and the Home Guard had boarded the L&N and were being transported south. The next morning they disembarked at Lebanon Junction and marched the remainder of the distance to Muldraugh's Hill.[66] Sherman's army was a motley crew since the Home Guard did not wear regulation uniforms and Rousseau's men were not well equipped,[67] but as rapidly as fresh troops reached Louisville they were sent to Sherman.[68]

Buckner, however, never seriously considered marching to Louisville or dislodging Sherman from the hill. He estimated his own strength at not more than 6,000 but believed Sherman would soon take the offensive with 13-14,000.[69] Sherman, on the other hand, estimated that Buckner had at least 15,000 whereas Sherman had only 4,000,[70] though later this number was increased. Consequently, the Union general had no intention of undertaking an offensive. Thus, Sherman and his men remained between Muldraugh's Hill and Elizabethtown while Buckner remained near Bowling Green with neither seriously engaging the other in battle.

Meanwhile, the Union command at Louisville underwent a change. General Anderson had not been in good health when he assumed command in the city. In fact his physicians had advised him to refrain from active duty; but he declared that the Union men of Kentucky were calling on him to lead them, and he must make the attempt.[71]

It was soon apparent that the pressures of his command and the fact that his native state was being torn asunder by split loyalties was too much for him. Sherman stated that while at Muldraugh's Hill, "the daily correspondence between General Anderson and myself satisfied me that the worry and harassment at Louisville were exhausting his strength and health, and that he would soon leave." [72] Finally on October 6, 1861, Winfield Scott relieved Anderson of his command so that he might have his health restored and turned over the command of the Department of the Cumberland to General Sherman.[73]

Sherman, however, remained in command only until November 15 when Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell replaced him and assumed the enlarged command of the Department of the Ohio.[74] During his month of command Sherman complained frequently and bitterly of the disloyalty of the Kentuckians, asserting that many joined the Confederate army but few the Union.[75] Then too, he saw the necessity of huge Union forces if the Confederates were to be beaten in the West. Ultimately it was probably his request for 200,000 men,[76] which seemed ridiculous or even insane to many, that led to his removal.

Buell quickly realized that Buckner was not going to attack Louisville but was fortifying himself at Bowling Green instead. Thus he wrote to General McClellan in November, "As for his attacking, though I do not intend to be unprepared for him, yet I should almost as soon expect to see the Army of the Potomac marching up the road." [77]

There were no other threats on Louisville or no more fighting near the city until the fall of 1862, but there is one other feature of the life of Louisville during the first year of the war that needs to be told.

On September 21, 1861, the first troops returning from the field, the 49th Ohio, passed through Louisville. With them came a consid-

erable number of soldiers who were ill and could not be left behind, but no hospital arrangements had been made for them in the city. The sick of Rousseau's brigade had already been taken from Camp Joe Holt to the Marine Hospital;[78] but since it was very limited in accommodations, no new soldiers could be taken there. Louisville was in the process of organizing two new hospitals, but they could not be used yet. Then too, since several of the men were sick with measles they could not be taken to the city hospital nor the infirmary. Eventually arrangements were made with a lady who kept a large boarding house near the depot, and the sick were taken there. From September 21 to October 22, sixty patients made use of these arrangements; and although several were very ill, none died.[79]

This was merely the beginning of a new problem for Louisville. During the fall of 1861 the sick accumulated rapidly. Trains brought them almost every evening. Sometimes they arrived in very large numbers, and at other times they arrived without previous notice having been sent to the Medical Director who was thus often obliged to extemporize hospital accommodations.[80] School buildings, churches, and even a few factories were made into "make-shift" hospitals and soon were filled to capacity with sick and wounded men.

In a seven-week period during the early part of 1862 (January-March) 265 soldiers died in these hospitals;[81] and according to Isabel McMeekin, more than one thousand died within the first nine months of the war.[82]

Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that considering the limitations of space, equipment, and personnel, the soldiers were well taken care of. According to newspaper reporters the rooms were kept clean and well ventilated with separate areas for the various diseases.[83] Also the shortage of medical personnel was partially compensated for by the voluntary services of many Louisville ladies who furnished provisions, prepared and served meals, and even took some patients into their homes.[84]

By March, 1862, the situation was well enough in hand that the twenty hospitals had been reduced and centralized into eight with approximately two thousand patients.[85] As the resources at the command of the Medical Department increased, the necessity for the direct services of the ladies greatly decreased; but many continued their work.[86]

Thus is concluded this short account of Louisville during the first year of the Civil War. Although the fighting did not actually reach the city, its effects were felt very deeply.

Economically the city profited from the war. The L&N during the period of neutrality and throughout the war carried more freight than it had ever done before and at the end of the war was bigger, wealthier,

and in better condition.[87] Though the river commerce suffered for a few months in 1861, it was reaching capacity by the spring of 1862 and continued that way throughout the war. Then, of course, the merchants made exorbitant profits from trading during the period of neutrality and later from war contracts.

Socially the city suffered, as did all cities in the country, from the death of many of its native sons. The tragedy of the Louisville situation was that regardless who won, many Louisvillians would be killed; for many fought on each side.

During this first year of the war the majority of the citizens remained moderate with respect to the sectional controversy. It is obvious from the material presented that some were strongly pro-Secessionist while others were equally strong for the North. However, most of the citizens of Louisville desired to remain in the Union, though they were opposed to any attempt to coerce a state which desired to secede.

FOOTNOTES

[1] *Daily Louisville Democrat,* 17 April 1861.

[2] E. Merton Coulter, *The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky* (Chapel Hill: U. of North Carolina Press, 1926), p. 57.

[3] Thomas Speed, "Civil War History—Federal," *Memorial History of Louisville from its First Settlement to the Year 1896,* ed. J. Stoddard Johnston (Chicago: American Biographical Publishing Co., 1896), I, p. 163.

[4] *Ibid.,* pp. 162, 200.

[5] Isabel M. McMeekin, *Louisville: The Gateway City* (New York: Julian Messner, Inc., 1946), p. 133; also see Albert D. Kirwan, ed., *Johnny Green of the Orphan Brigade; the Journal of a Confederate Soldier* (Lexington: U. of Kentucky Press, 1956).

[6] Wilson Porter Shortridge, "Kentucky Neutrality in 1861," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* IX (March, 1923), pp. 286-7.

[7] *Louisville Daily Courier,* 5 August 1861.

[8] U. S. War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (hereafter cited as *O. R.*), Series I, Vol. IV (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1882), p. 327, Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman, Commanding, Department of the Cumberland, Louisville, 2 November 1861, to General W. T. Ward, Campbellsville, Kentucky.

[9] *Ibid.,* p. 313, L. Thomas, Adjutant-General, Washington, 21 October 1861, to Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War.

[10] *Louisville Daily Courier,* 18 April 1861, 20 April 1861, 17 May 1861, and 5 August 1861.

[11] *Ibid.,* 21 August 1861.

[12] *Cincinnati Daily Gazette,* 19 September 1861.

[13] Coulter, *op. cit.,* p. 255.

[14] *Louisville Daily Journal,* 26 April 1861.

[15] *Daily Louisville Democrat,* 12 February 1861.

[16] *Ibid.,* 8 February 1861.

[17] Coulter, *op. cit.*, p. 255.
[18] Speed, *op. cit.*, pp. 131, 133, 160, 161.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 161.
[20] R. M. Kelly, "Holding Kentucky for the Union," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, ed. Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel (New York: The Century Co., 1887), I, p. 375, hereafter cited as *Battles and Leaders;* and Speed, *op. cit.*, p. 165.
[21] Speed, *op. cit.*, p. 168.
[22] *Battles and Leaders*, I, p. 377.
[23] Speed, *op. cit.*, p. 163.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 165.
[25] Frank Moore, ed., *The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events* (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1861 ff), III, p. 26, hereafter cited as *Rebellion Record.*
[26] J. Stoddard Johnston, ed., *Memorial History of Louisville from its First Settlement to the Year 1896* (Chicago: American Biographical Publishing Co., [1896]), I, p. 103.
[27] Thomas Weber, *The Northern Railroads in the Civil War, 1861-1865* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1952), p. 95; and R. S. Cotterill, "The Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 1861-1865," *American Historical Review*, XXIX (1923-1924), p. 702.
[28] George R. Leighton, *America's Growing Pains: The Romance, Comedy, and Tragedy of Five Great Cities* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939), p. 62; Kincaid A. Herr. *The Louisville and Nashville Railroad* (3rd printing; Louisville: L & N Magazine, 1959), pp. 16-17.
[29] Cotterill, *op. cit.*, p. 702; Herr, *op. cit.*, p. 17; and Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 95.
[30] Leighton, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
[31] *Illinois Weekly State Journal*, 15 May 1861.
[32] Coulter, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.
[33] Cotterill, *op. cit.*, p. 703.
[34] J. W. Schuckers, *The Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase* (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1874), p. 319, Salmon P. Chase, Washington, 29 May 1861, to William P. Mellen.
[35] Robert Frank Futrell, "Federal Trade with the Confederate States, 1861-1865: A Study of Governmental Policy" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1950), p. 15.
[36] Schuckers, *op. cit.*, p. 425, Salmon P. Chase, Washington, 28 May 1861, to George D. Prentice, Louisville, Kentucky.
[37] Futrell, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[39] *Cincinnati Daily Gazette*, 24 June 1861.
[40] Futrell, *op. cit.*, p. 14; and Leighton, *op. cit.*, p. 63.
[41] John Leeds Kerr, *The Story of a Southern Carrier: The Louisville and Nashville* (New York: Young and Ottley, Inc., 1933), p. 21; and *Illinois Weekly State Journal*, 12 June 1861.
[42] Coulter, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
[43] *Illinois Weekly State Journal*, 24 July 1861 and 28 August 1861.
[44] *Cincinnati Daily Gazette*, 22 July 1861 and 31 July 1861.
[45] Futrell, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.
[46] Herr, *op. cit.*, p. 17; and Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 96.
[47] Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 96; and Leighton, *op. cit.*, p. 63.
[48] *O. R.*, IV, pp. 414-415, Brigadier-General Simon B. Buckner, Bowling Green, 18 September 1861, to James Guthrie, Louisville.
[49] Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 180.
[50] Johnston, *op. cit.*, I, p. 103.
[51] Coulter, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-60.
[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 62.
[54] *Louisville Daily Courier*, 18 April 1861.
[55] *Louisville Daily Journal*, 18 April 1861.
[56] Coulter, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
[57] *Daily Louisville Democrat*, 3 May 1863.
[58] *Cincinnati Daily Commercial*, 6 January 1862; and McMeekin, *op. cit.*, p. 131.
[59] *O. R.*, IV, p. 257.
[60] *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 407-408, W. W. Mackall, Assistant Adjutant-General, Nashville, 15 September 1861, to Brigadier-General S. B. Buckner.
[61] *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 413-414, Brigadier-General S. B. Buckner, Bowling Green, 18 September 1861, to Adjutant-General S. Cooper.

[62] William T. Sherman, *Memoirs of General William T. Sherman* (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1875), I, p. 197.

[63] *Cincinnati Daily Gazette*, 20 September 1861; and *Battles and Leaders*, I, p. 379.

[64] *Battles and Leaders*, I, p. 380; and Speed, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

[65] Sherman, *op. cit.*, I, p. 198.

[66] *Ibid.*; and *O. R.*, IV, pp. 278-279, Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman, Muldraugh's Hill, Kentucky, 27 September 1861, to Captain Oliver D. Greene, Assistant Adjutant-General, Louisville.

[67] *Battles and Leaders*, I, p. 380.

[68] Sherman, *op. cit.*, I, p. 199.

[69] *O. R.*, IV, p. 437, Brigadier-General S. B. Buckner, Bowling Green, 4 October 1861, to W. W. Mackall, Assistant Adjutant-General.

[70] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 279, Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman, Muldraugh's Hill, Kentucky, 27 September 1861, to Captain Oliver D. Greene, Assistant Adjutant-General, Louisville; and p. 295, Anson Stager, Louisville, 7 October 1861, to Eckert.

[71] *Louisville Daily Courier*, 15 August 1861.

[72] Sherman, *op. cit.*, I, p. 199.

[73] *O. R.*, IV, p. 296, Winfield Scott, Washington, 6 October 1861, to Brigadier-General Anderson.

[74] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 358.

[75] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 313, L. Thomas, Adjutant-General, Washington, 21 October 1861, to Simon Cameron, Secretary of War.

[76] *Ibid.*

[77] *O. R.*, VII, p. 444, D. C. Buell, Louisville, 22 November 1861, to Major-General George B. McClellan.

[78] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 261, Brigadier-General Robert Anderson, Commanding, Department of the Cumberland, Louisville, 18 September 1861, to W. M. Bricken.

[79] J. S. Newberry, *The U. S. Sanitary Commission in the Valley of the Mississippi During the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1866* (Cleveland: Fairbanks, Benedict, and Co., 1871), p. 301.

[80] *Ibid.*

[81] *Cincinnati Daily Commercial*, various dates January through March, 1862.

[82] McMeekin, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

[83] *Cincinnati Daily Commercial*, 9 January 1862.

[84] Speed, *op. cit.*, p. 190; and Newberry, *op. cit.*, p. 304.

[85] *Cincinnati Daily Commercial*, 1 March 1862.

[86] Newberry, *op. cit.*, p. 304.

[87] Leighton, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.